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CONTRIBUTORY FAULT AND INVESTOR MISCONDUCT IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
By
Matthew Nichol*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The author Martin Jarrett1 wrote Contributory Fault and Investor Misconduct in Investment
Arbitration to analyze and fill in the current gaps in international investment law in terms of
contributory fault.2 The current state of contributory fault in international investment law is
uncertain: it has been discussed by different arbitral tribunals, scholarly research, and treaties, but
has never been uniformly put together into a cohesive structure.3 While many established rules
exist as to when host states are liable for breaching investment treaties, it is less uniform when
discussing the investor’s contributory fault through their own actions.4
Jarrett begins with a general overview of international investment arbitration and the lack
of uniformity in the field.5 He starts outside of the arbitration field by trying to qualify contributory
fault as to what legal category it belongs to: admissibility, jurisdictional, liability, or remedies.6
Jarrett argues that it should be classified under liabilities, and then further qualified as a defense.7
In classifying contributory fault as such, the author takes a deep dive into the legal definitions of
remedies, liability, elements of defenses, and others to set a foundation of legal philosophy.8 He
also establishes a new legal theory for causation, based on what he calls “Causal Constellations.”9
This new theory puts together existing law into a formula that he believes corrects several errors
of mainstream causation formulas.10
*
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2. MARTIN JARRETT, CONTRIBUTORY FAULT AND INVESTOR MISCONDUCT IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Cambridge
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3. Id. at 2.
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5. Id. at 1-15.
6. Id. at 3-14.
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8. Id. at 16-42.
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The author then identifies three defenses that host states can use against investors during a
dispute: mismanagement, investment reprisal, and post-establishment illegality.11 He discusses the
major issues in all of these identified defenses; mainly problems in causation and apportionment
of liability.12 He concludes by expressing the first restatement of contributory fault in international
investment arbitration, which arbitral tribunals can use as a basis for their decision making in these
types of disputes.13
In advance of this article, allow me to summarize how one ascends to investment
arbitration. Investment arbitration referred to here is when an out of state investor, via a treaty or
contract, invests money into economic projects in a “host state’s” country.14 The purpose of this is
to help develop the economy of the host state, and for the investor to profit.15 Usually, these treaties
or contracts come with rules or an expectation that the host state will do certain things to promote,
or refrain from harming unnecessarily, an out of state investor’s investment.16 If the host state
breaks their end of the treaty obligations, the investor can take them to an investment arbitration
proceeding over the dispute. Contributory fault comes into play when the investor did something
that either caused the host state’s reaction which led to the negative consequences, or their own
actions themselves led to negative consequences felt by the investment. In summary, contributory
fault is a defense used by host states whenever an investor claims the host state has breached their
duties after the investor suffers a loss.
II.

OVERVIEW

Contributory fault is an interesting area of law. In many nations’ domestic laws, it is quite
developed through other areas of law such as tort law.17 However, in international investment law,
the focus has been almost exclusively on a host state’s liability.18 This may be because of the law’s
focus on promoting businesses and economic growth above all, even state sovereignty: an issue
which Jarrett wishes to end by finally bringing together the different defenses host states can use
against investor’s wrongful conduct.19 The book requires a developed knowledge of arbitration
and law in general in order to be understood. Assumptions are made that the reader knows certain
topics, and this can be challenging.
11. Id. at 79-159.
12. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 79-159.
13. Id. at 162-64.
14. Id. at 75-77.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 76-77.
17. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 2.
18. Id. at 1-2.
19. Id.
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Jarrett presents several new theories which generally make sense; more in depth
commentary on the theories will be provided in this review. However, one is surprised that new
theories are being explored in this book, especially a brand new theory of causation, which is
contrary to Jarrett’s stated purpose of restating and organizing current law.20 This can throw
readers off: not only is the author trying to summarize, promote, and centralize an area of law in
which such uniformity is lacking, but the author also wants to take on legal theories of causation
as a whole.21 While causation is crucial to understanding contributory fault, the author should have
laid out early on that a new legal causation theory was also on his ‘to-do’ list to limit confusion.
Another related issue is that while trying to lay out different legal elements as a foundation in the
beginning part of the book, the author does not use international investment law examples.22 This
was likely done to expand his theory beyond one area of law. However, the book would have been
better served if the author used examples from international investment law in describing these
legal elements from the beginning. This would have made it easier to attach these elements to the
overall goal of the book of developing and analyzing contributory fault in international investment
law. This article will follow along on Jarrett’s journey of trying to organize this area of the law
more effectively, and provide commentary along the way.
III.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER: AN OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTORY FAULT

Jarrett’s attempt to centralize contributory fault in investment arbitration begins with a
brief, general overview of a typical investment arbitration’s proceeding. This chapter is an
efficient, short introduction to international investment law. The general overview of modern
investment artbirtation proceeddings begins with with jurisdictional decisions.23 Typically, the
issue comes down to consent from both parties.24 The state gives consent by agreeing to the
investment treaty.25 When it comes to the investor’s consent, the author believes the “mirror
approach” should be taken, and that by investing via the treaty they also consent.26
Next, is the issue of admissibility, which examines the claim itself.27 Usual admissibility
rules in investment arbitration disputes include mandating litigation before arbitration or a “no

20. Id. at 1-3.
21. Id. at 1-164.
22. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 1-40.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 4-5.
26. Some scholars believe the investor must specifically consent to the arbitration, the author disagrees due to the
protections investors receive from signing onto the treaties. See id. at 6-7.
27. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 8-10.
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prior binding resolution.”28 It can also include compulsory negotiation or mediation, a statute of
limitations, or a correlative rule.29 Three results are possible when ruling on admissibility. The first
result is “positive,” meaning that all requirements are met and arbitration is allowed.30 The second
result is “negative admission,” meaning not all requirements are met, but reparation acts can and
will be taken that can allow arbitration.31 The third result is “negative,” meaning the cause of action
is dead.32 An example is if the statute of limitations for arbitration has passed. A negative result
requires the issue to go to a court rather than arbitration.
The following segment is the liability phase, also known as the merits phase.33 This is
divided into two parts: the cause of action and defenses. When it comes to the cause of action, the
main question is: did the state’s conduct breach its duty?34 In establishing a cause of action, the
author believes it needs a “harm” legal element.35 This is a contentious claim. Under the author’s
theory, a cause of action could never be used to stop future, predictable conduct, the investor must
wait until harm occurs. However, the author's viewpoint is understandable because asking an
arbitral tribunal to calculate future damages when current ones have not yet been committed would
be difficult, and it could encroach upon state sovereignty by being overbearing and predicative of
a state’s potential future actions. The lack of discussion leaves the reader wanting.
When it comes to defenses, the main contentions are: 1) is there conduct that falls into the
scope of a defense; and 2) is the conduct attributable to the subject of the defense?36 An established
complete defense means the defendant is not liable at all. 37 Defenses can also attribute partial
liability to both sides either based on a percentage or based on fault, and can make each side

28. See id. at 8-9. (defining a “no prior binding resolution” as a choice between a court in the host state or arbitration).
29. See id. at 10 (defining a “correlative rule” as a rule in which the defense must be plead against the investor’s cause
of action rather than just simply ignore aspects of it).
30. Id. at 11.
31. An example of a reparation that could save arbitration is forced prior mediation or negotiation. See id.
32. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 11.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. This is somewhat controversial, becaus no statutes, rules, or texts specifically states that harm must be an element
for these causes of action. However, the author believes the purpose of these suits and dispute settlements is to protect
that investment, so harm must be there to protect those damaged investments. Id. at 11.
36. Id. at 12.
37. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 12.
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partially liable related thereto.38 If no defense is established and a cause of action is found, the host
state is one hundred percent liable.39
The tribunal concludes with its issuance of remedies, which must answer three questions.
First, does the tribunal have jurisdiction of the remedy it wants to issue?40 Second, what remedies
are available and how to pick the extent of the remedy?41 The most popular remedy is fair market
value compensation for losses and expected losses.42 Third, the actual calculation of the
compensation.43 There are several valuation methods: 1) the hypothetical bargain option; 2) the
income capitalization valuation; and 3) the asset based approach.44
The first chapter is very short, only comprising fifteen pages, while the other chapters are
about fifty pages. This chapter is a direct introduction that is to the point and, importantly, remains
on topic throughout. It is full of important introductory material on international investment law.
It also places contributory fault within the liability phase of a tribunal’s proceedings because it is
a defense, and defenses belong in the liability phase. Having introduced this overview of an
investment arbitration proceeding, the author then takes us into why he believes contributory fault
falls, as its legal function, under the qualification of defenses, rather than anything else.
IV.

FURTHER LEGAL BACKGROUND

The next two chapters focus less directly on contributory fault in international investment
law, and more on generic legal definitions and functions of both defenses and causation to help
develop the author’s overall Restatement of Law.
A. Chapter 2: Developing a Definition of Defense
Now that the author has placed contributory fault as a part of liability, chapter two focuses
on defining a defense, if contributory fault and investor misconduct fit into it, and what other
aspects may qualify as a defense. Currently, there is no one definition of “defense.”45 To solve
this, the author presents a universal definition of a “defense,” composed of six elements:
A rule that relates to the liability question and has a correlative relationship with a
liability rule, but contains either, one, an external legal element compared to that
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Some tribunals have contractual limitations. Most do not, so it is typically an easy bar to meet. Id. at 13.
41. Tribunals rarely enforce performance to avoid infringing on states’ sovereignty. See id.
42. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 13.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 14.
45. For example, in US criminal and tort law, there are at least five definitions of what a “defense” is. Id. at 16.
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rule or, two, restricts the definitional scope of any legal element in that rule. If
proven by a respondent, it operates to eliminate or reduce the liability of that
respondent.46
The first of these elements is that it involves the “liability question,” which means a defense
must assess the quality of the conduct.47 Conduct must be relevant to the dispute, or beneficial to
the subject matter at the disputes core to be relevant. The second element is a “correlative
relationship,” which means a defense correlates to liability rules, and this is because a defense’s
invocation is dependent on proof of the applicable liability rule’s breach. 48 Practically, a defense
comes after conduct has been determined to be a breach of liability. The third element is an
“external legal element,” which simply means the defense must have an additional element outside
the claim of breach.49 Without this additional element, the claimant would be proving the defense
against themselves. The fourth element is that it restricts the “definitional scope,” which practically
means the same actions and elements have different outcomes.50 The fifth element is that the
respondent has the burden of proof for the elements of their legal theory and defense. 51 There is
some concern among legal scholars that this may shift too much burden to the respondent,
however, the author believes this should not be a concern.52 The final element is that it operates to
eliminate or reduce liability of that respondent.53
Since the end goal of a partial defense is to lower the amount paid, why should it be
considered under liability and not remedies?54 Liability comes before remedies, and a defense acts
as a cap on recoverable remedies, rather than acting as a remedy itself. Fundamentally, however,
liability regulates human conduct, and it asks if a defendant’s or claimant’s action is acceptable or

46. Id. at 17.
47. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 17-18.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 19-21.
52. An example of this is the statute of limitations of any particular claim, which prevents a claim from being brought
after a certain number of years. This is not a defense because it does not relate to the merits of the claim, but restrict
the claim itself, and should be the respondent’s burden to prove. See JARRETT supra note 2, at 21.
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. at 23-24.
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faultworthy.55 This evaluation of human character and fault based on the same conduct is the
fundamental reason the claimant’s fault-worthy acts, used as a defense, belongs in liabilities.56
Now that defense has been defined and placed in liabilities, the next question is if a specific
legal element should be a part of the defense or the liability. This is important because elements
placed with the defense must to be proven by the respondent host state, and those placed with
liability must be proven by the claimant investor.57 Because liability comes before the defense, the
liability rule should be determined first. Simply suffering a loss cannot constitute a breach.58 There
must be actions by the host state that constitute a breach; just because harm befalls an investor
does not mean the host state automatically breached their duties. 59 Likewise, if the harm to an
investor is minimal, or “insufficiently harmful to justify the creation of a liability rule,” other
factors must come into play.60 So, liability rules’ baseline legal elements are those which either 1)
prevent or limit the harm; or 2) create the benefit the liability rule concerns itself with.61 Two
factors to consider are if the action alone is sufficiently wrongful enough to create liability without
any other factors, or the access to the evidence.62 If the respondent has better access to the evidence
of that element, it is more likely an element of a defense, rather than a liability, and vice versa.63
When identifying defenses practically: if the burden of proof for an element or for a rule is
on the respondent, then it is a defense; if it is on the claimant, then it is a liability rule.64 Without
a burden of proof standard, there are several factors to consider, including structural distinction,
general applicability, and key words.65 Structural distinction refers to the rule being physically
separated from the original liability rule, and if it is, it lends itself more to being a defense. 66
General applicability, on the other hand, is a defense where a rule generally applies to all liability

55. Id.
56. Id. at 24.
57. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 24-25.
58. Id. at 26.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 27.
62. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 29.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 30.
65. Id. at 30-31.
66. Id. at 30.
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rules.67 Key words refers to specific words that indicate the relevant rule is a defense. Such words
include “except,” “unless,” and “exception.”68
One of the important objectives of the author is to distinguish defenses from similar legal
concepts. The author discusses denials, exceptions, claim admissibility and jurisdictional rules,
and remedies. A denial is an argument that a legal element of the liability rule cannot be
established.69 This differs from contributory fault because contributory fault rests on an admission
that a state’s conduct harms an investor, but the key for contributory fault is if the investor is
harmed himself through his own actions. An exception is a rule that “limits the definitional scope
of a legal element in another rule.”70 Some exceptions are defenses, but only those exceptions that
“refine the definitional scope of a legal element” are defenses.71 When it comes to legal remedies,
they measure or limit a remedy, whereas defenses eliminate or limit liability.72 A jurisdictional
rule or claim admissibility rule is one in which bars the claim itself, with no focus on the
conduct.73 In summary, the legal function of defenses is to reduce or eliminate liability of the
respondent, because both relate to evaluating conduct specifically. Contributory fault and investor
misconduct are used to reduce or eliminate liability of the host state, and therefore, they are
defenses.74
This chapter was full of conceptual and theoretical discussions about the law in general,
with only some of it relating directly to international investment law. With the various conceptual
theories, it can be confusing to understand the concluding points. The author is straightforward
and efficient while referring to other parts of the chapter whenever he is trying to tie sections
together.75 He quickly summarizes a former section in a sentence or two. This keeps the sections
less confusing, requires less flipping back and forth between pages, and adds order to the chaotic
theories. The author devotes a significant amount of this chapter to the differences between
defenses and remedies, and jurisdictional law.76 The second chapter repeats much of the discussion
in the first chapter and easily could have been combined with the first chapter. The overlap between
67. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 31.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 33.
70. Id. at 35.
71. This is because they change the quality of what conduct is wrongful, which is related to liability. See id. at 36.
72. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 41.
73. Id. at 37-40. (Examples of these are the admissibility rules explained above, such as the statute of limitations. It
“bars, rather than extinguishes, a cause of action.”).
74. Id. at 42.
75. The author mentions the admissibility question, and how it was “discussed in section 3.2 of chapter 1.” This makes
it easy on a potentially confused reader to compare the sections. See id. at 37.
76. Id. at 33-41.
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the multiple sections discussing the same general legal principles can cause confusion, and a
congested chapter.
B. Chapter 3: Causation for International Investment Law and Arbitration
Chapter three continues the discussion of legal theories from chapter two, but changes
course from defenses and their functions, to causation. Causation is a crucial legal element to
understanding contributory fault, because both sides must cause the harm for contributory fault to
conceptually apply.77 The author begins by discussing current main causation theories, and their
faults. The main theory used throughout international investment law is the Factual-Legal
Causation Theory, which is broken into two parts: the Factual Causation Test and the Legal
Causation Test.78 The Factual Test is satisfied with the “But-For Test” – but for the event or
conduct, the consequence would not have occurred.79 Legal Causation is less formally developed,
and only two main domestic and one international legal principles outline it.80The domestic legal
principles involved are that the cause must be foreseeable to be legally relevant, and the harm
within the risk principle. This second one means the consequence must be one the rule sought to
avoid if the consequence occurred in the manner the rule envisioned.81 The relevant international
law principle is if the claimant provokes the respondent there are three outcomes: 1) if the
respondent’s response is proportionate, the claimant is responsible; 2) if the response is
disproportionate, the causal responsibility rests on the respondent; and 3) if the two parties go after
each other, they share liability.82
The author believes this theory, in both its factual and legal aspect, to be “inadequate . . .
for international investment law.”83 He has two issues with the factual test. First, nearly every
event could satisfy the but-for test, meaning it lacks any value. Second, when two actions or events
occur that could have caused a consequence, this theory does not provide an effective solution for
this predicament. Typically, tribunals just answer that whichever one appears substantial is the
dominant cause. This, however, is an arbitrary answer that is rife with unpredictability.84
Likewise, the author has several issues with the current theory’s legal causation. First, he
believes there are many issues with “foreseeability,” as to defining what is actually foreseeable,

77. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 43.
78. Id. at 43-44.
79. Id. at 44.
80. Id. at 45.
81. Id. at 46-47.
82. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 47-48.
83. Id. at 48.
84. Id. at 48-50.
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and how it is more relevant to fault worthiness, than causation.85 Second, international investment
law is meant for open textured rules, whereas this theory of legal causation only allows for
application of specific rules.86 Finally, and most importantly, legal causation principles transferred
from domestic law are developed for laws that do not belong in international investment law.87
Having discussed the current causation theory, and believing he discredited it, the author
presents his theory for causation for international investment law: Causal Constellations. In his
theory, only voluntary human conduct can be an antecedent for factual causation.88 Omission can
be a potential cause in two ways. First, Cause-Prevention Omission, which is the failure to make
a person perform or prevent a person from performing conduct; which contains four elements:
preventability, capacity to prevent, awareness, and a special relationship. 89 The second type of
potential cause omission is Consequence-Avoidance Omission, which is an omission of an act that,
if performed, would avoid the occurrence of the related consequence.90 This requires avoidability
and actual or constructive capacity.
He then briefly introduces the seven consequences that can befall anyone, including here,
investors.91 Having established this, the author’s theory is based around the idea of continuous
causality, meaning that every consequence usually results from multiple conducts.92 The key is
determining which conduct deserves responsibility for the consequence. He terms this as a
consequence’s “Causal Constellations,” which are made up of the causes of each type of
consequence, and each consequence has different ways potential causes turn into a direct
cause.93 The author goes through every consequence, and the requirements for the antecedents for
each one. Nearly every consequence has a positional and a change antecedent or agent, which leads

85. Id. at 52.
86. Id. at 52-53.
87. For example, in American Tort Law, causation via negligence has to work with a duty element in order to control
liability. See JARRETT, supra note 2, at 53.
88. Interestingly, this excludes natural circumstances and natural forces as antecedents). Id. at 54.
89. Once these factors are met, responsibility can shift from party to party. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech
Republic, Ad Hoc Arbitration (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules), Partial Award (‘CME v. Czechia, Partial Award’) (13
September 2001) 600. See id. at 56-58.
90. Id. at 58-59.
91. See id. at 61. (Death; Physical Circumstance; Physical Conduct; Mental; Legal Circumstance; Legal Conduct;
Artificial).
92. See JARRETT, supra note 2, at 61-62.
93. Id. at 62-63.
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to the consequence.94 To put this in perspective, in the current subject, owning the investment is
the positional antecedent, and the change antecedent is a change in the law by the host state. 95
The final main issue is when there are multiple causes, who is responsible? With physical
conduct or legal conduct consequences, people are causally responsible for their physical or legal
conduct. There are three exceptions to this: legal imperatives, factual imperatives, and
inducements.96 Legal imperatives are where an action is performed in accordance with the law.97
Factual imperatives are unlawful conduct of a person or state which causes the performing person
to believe their acts must be done to avoid some harm.98 The third exception is inducements, where
a party induces the performing party to act, the inducing party is responsible. The action must be
1) unlawful or immoral; 2) the inducing party believes the performing person will perform; and 3)
a fiduciary or special relationship exists between the two.99 For the other consequences, conduct
is typically required.100 However, some allow for beliefs, physical or legal circumstances, and
shareholder devaluation to be considered.101
This chapter could be the subject of its own article. The author attempts to create a new
theory of causation that is applicable to all law, not just international investment law.102 This
chapter can create some confusion for the reader. While understanding causation is crucial to
understanding contributory fault, it is a surprise that the author is creating a new theory, when
earlier he claimed to simply be attempting to create uniformity among current law. This would
imply that causation, which has other theories, should follow the established theories. The theory
itself is unique, and does a sufficient job of addressing the issues that the author raised about the
other theories of causation. Although it can be difficult to understand this conceptual chapter, by

94. For example, physical conduct results from mental causation, so their Causal Constellation is the mental states
which converge during conduct. Another example is legal circumstance consequence. The legal conduct changing the
legal concept is the change antecedent, and the positional antecedent is the act that leads to the conflict. See id. at 6471.
95. This standard is a little tougher on investors than usual. See id. at 69-71.
96. Id. at 71.
97. If an investor follows the law, they are not causally responsible for their physical conduct, the host state is
responsible as they created the law. See JARRETT, supra note 2, at 71-72.
98. An applicable example would be revoking an investor’s business permit. Id. at 72-73.
99. See id. at 74; see e.g., Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006),
70, 71, 74, 106. Where Argentina encouraged Azurix’s customers to leave them, making Argentina responsible.
100. Id. at 74-75.
101. The author gives an excellent example of rioters attack an investor’s factory, and the investor has to move. The
author goes through, step by step, how the conduct is determined in the Causal Constellation. See also id. at 76-77.
102. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 43-78.
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the end, it all comes together nicely with the rioters and the factory example.103 This ties together
the different aspects of the theory, and gives a potential, and understandable, real life example.
V.

TYPES OF CONTRIBUTORY FAULT AND THEIR APPLICATION

The next two chapters focus entirely on specific types of contributory fault in international
investment lawm which apply to many of the legal elements the author has discussed throughout
the book.
A. Chapter 4: Mismanagement
The first type of contributory fault the author explores is mismanagement.104 In
mismanagement, the investor’s act is the direct cause of the consequences they suffer, while the
host state’s actions are indirect causes.105 Mismanagement in this context is defined as: investing
in a host state with foreseeability that the host state could perform an act to harm the investment.106
The investor injecting capital into the investment is the direct cause of the consequence. The
investor is at fault whether their actions are intentional, reckless, or negligent.107 Reckless
mismanagement occurs with foresight of consequence at the time it performs its causal
contribution. The investor meets this requirement, and the host state acquires this partial defense,
if the investor has foresight on 1) the nature of the consequence; 2) foresight of the consequences
extent; and 3) foresight on consequences causes.108
Negligent mismanagement is not based on US tort law, or the popular von NeumannMorgenstern Utility Theory.109 The author instead wants to use the Objective Foreseeability
Standard, which must meet the same three foreseeability requirements as recklessness, but also
include potential access to information through either the public domain, professional advice, or
103. In the rioters and factory example, rioters destroy an investor’s factory, and the investor fears that his employees
are in danger and relocates them to another state. There are two causes in the causal constellation for the factory’s
destruction: the rioting and positioning of the factory. Here, the rioters assume the causal responsibility as their conduct
was faultworthy. This example assumes that rioting in the host state is unlawful, and caused the investor to reasonably
believe relocating his employees would avoid harm. Causal responsibility could also transfer to the host state, if their
failure to stop the rioting constitutes a cause-prevention omission. See id. at 75-77.
104. Id. at 79-110.
105. Id. at 79.
106. An example of mismanagement is purchasing shareholding in a company conducting stem cell research in a host
state where one of the main parties has called for eradication of stem cell research. See id. at 80.
107. Intentional is rare, because an investor would not intentionally harm their investments. See JARRETT, supra note
2, at 80-87.
108. Id. at 86-87.
109. The theory calls for a utility formula to determine whether an investment was a wise decision or not. For negligent
mismanagement, it could be used to determine if an action had higher utility, then their actions were not negligent.
The author rejects this idea due to complication and variety of factors, among other reasons. See id. at 91-92.
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meetings with the host state’s representatives.110 Having established when an investor’s conduct
reaches the threshold of mismanagement, the author turns to the apportionment of the blame. Two
methods the author rejects are splitting the liability 50-50, because it is too simple, and starting at
100% liability for the host state and reducing thereof, because it is too erratic. 111 So the author
creates another new test, “Restitutionary Apportionment,” to determine mismanagement’s
apportionment of liability.112 In this new test, once mismanagement has been established, the host
state starts at zero percent liability, and liability is added onto it based mainly on the investment
and impact on the host state’s economy.113 This apportionment is calculated through direct
contributions, indirect contributions, and other contributions.114
Although mismanagement is typically admissible, it may not be used as a defense by the
host state if the host state’s actions are egregious.115 Mismanagement is based on the voluntary
assumption of risk by the investor, which is different from conceptually similar legal elements,
such as consent, devaluation of loss, and an unviable business plan.116
This extensive chapter covers mismanagement in detail, a specific type of defense and
contributory fault. The chapter is full of international investment law examples, and the entire
chapter discusses international investment law more directly. This is a nice change of pace from
the previous chapters, which mostly discuss abstract concepts and theories. Generally, author’s
ideas on mismanagement and its applicability are understandable and agreeable.
B. Chapter 5: Investment Reprisal & Post-Establishment Illegality
Chapter five looks into the final two specific defenses that the author raises: investment
reprisal and post-establishment illegality.117 It follows the same pattern as the previous chapter,
discussing when an investor is liable for their action and the host state may enact the defense, and
then, once established, how much liability should be apportioned to each side.
Investment reprisal and post-establishment illegality are defenses by the host state.118 They
are enacted by the host state following blameworthy conduct by the investor that directly and
110. Id. at 91.
111. Id. at 94.
112. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 95.
113. Id.
114. Direct contributions are those that the investor has made directly into the state’s economy; indirect contributions
are new income from the investment, taking into account political risk and likelihood host state would enact the risk;
other contributions are purchases of established investments or pre-existing assets in the host states. Id. at 95-98.
115. An example of egregious actions which bar the defense would be corruption of the host state. See id. at 104-105.
116. Id. at 104-106.
117. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 110-159.
118. Id. at 110.
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negatively impacts the state. Mismanagement requires an investor to directly cause the loss.
However, in investment reprisal, the state directly causes the loss, and in post-establishment
illegality, the investor’s misconduct founds the breach of the liability rule.119 Investment reprisal
is misconduct that needs only to amount to an affront of state’s sovereignty, which provokes the
state’s action that directly harms the investment.120 Post-establishment illegality requires illegal
conduct from the investor.121 The benefit from the investment drives the conduct, since a profit
from illegal activity may drive more illegality.
Once one of these defenses has been established, the tribunal turns toward apportionment
of liability. In investment reprisal, if the host state’s response is proportionate to the investor’s
wrongful conduct, then they can use it as a complete defense, which eliminates any liability for
the host state.122 If their response, however, is disproportionate, then the investor’s gains and the
host state’s losses connected to the investor misconduct are subtracted from the host state’s
liability.123 This makes sense, as the purpose of the rule is to allow the host state to regain their
sovereignty from an investor’s misconduct, not to punitively punish them arbitrarily. Postestablishment illegality has the same apportionment rules as investment reprisal, unless there is a
specific mandatory legal consequence in the law which made the activity illegal.124
In this chapter, the author makes an interesting decision to compare these two defenses.
This has its benefits, especially with their similar apportionment approaches. However, it has its
drawbacks, and the author could have spaced out the two discussions, and simply used similar
referrals to previous sections as he did earlier. Also, the sections on post-establishment illegality
were underdeveloped compared to the ones on investment reprisal, which was interesting because
investment reprisal was mentioned earlier in the book, whereas post-establishment illegality was
introduced for the first time. Overall this chapter is easy to read since it follows the pattern set in
the prior chapter, allowing the reader to know what critical information to be on the lookout for.
VI.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

Chapter six thoroughly summarizes the entirety of the author’s main arguments. In his
summary, the author talks about how he defined defense and recognized that contributory fault
was a defense.125 Contributory fault has two legal elements: causal contribution by the claimant
and wrongful nature of the conduct done.126 Causation should be determined by the author’s new
119. Id.
120. Id. at 124.
121. The conduct can be illegal under treaties, the host state’s law, or the investor-state contract. See id. at 128-129.
122. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 137.
123. Id. at 137-138.
124. If there is a such a consequence, then the arbitral tribunal should apply it. Id. at 144.
125. Id. at 160.
126. Id.
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theory of “Causal Constellations,” which distinguishes direct causes from indirect causes.
Mismanagement and investment reprisal are the two main forms of contributory fault.127
Mismanagement is a direct cause of the negative consequences, where actions taken by the investor
directly led to the harm; whereas investment reprisal is the indirect causes conducted by host
states.128
After determining which sort of contributory fault applies, the next step is determining
wrongfulness of conduct.129 In mismanagement, the investor’s foresight of political risk
determines what led to the breach, which is not inherently wrong by itself.130 With investment
reprisal, the investors conduct must be wrong, whereas with post-establishment illegality, the
investor’s conduct is wrong because it is illegal.131
Now that contributory fault has been established, how does contributory fault affect host
state’s liability?132 An appropriation method is used for each defense because most defenses are
partial defenses. With mismanagement, each compensable loss is identified and liability is pinned
to either the investor or the host state.133 With investment reprisal and post-establishment illegality,
the investor’s gains and host state’s losses from the investor misconduct is transferred to the host
state to show the investor’s level of liability.134 The author finally concludes the book with his full,
new restatement of contributory fault and investor misconduct in international investment law.135
This chapter is a perfect ending to the book: tying everything together and ensuring the
author's main points get across. It made clear how smaller points fit into the grand scheme of the
book. A reader would benefit from reading this section first, and then starting from the beginning,
so as to see where most elements of the book fit.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Martin Jarrett wrote Contributory Fault and Investor Misconduct in Investment Arbitration
to analyze and fill in the gaps in international investment law in relation to contributory fault,
which is currently neither certain nor uniform.136 Uniformity in the law leads to less overall
127. JARRETT, supra note 2, at Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 161.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. JARRETT, supra note 2, at Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 162-164.
136. Id. at 1-2.
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disputes, and increased efficiency and predictability. Through his summary of the law, Jarrett
therefore wishes to expand such uniformity to this area of the law.
Overall, the book provides the reader with an extensive background of international
investment law, and the author provides a daring and extensive Restatement that he believes can
be used in arbitration when contributory fault is at issue.137 This could be used by tribunals around
the globe when looking at a host state’s breaches and investor’s contributory misconduct. While it
is a complex field full of complex conceptual discussions, it is an educational and important book
in helping the development of this area of law. As Jarrett states, “objections might be made to its
complexity, but these should be disregarded on the account of the truism that complexity is often
a necessary incidental of developing the law.”138

137. JARRETT, supra note 2, at 162-164.
138. Id. at 109.
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